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An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich*
We urge you to reconsider your proposal to amend the House Rules to
require a three-fifths vote for enactment of laws that increase income taxes.'
This proposal violates the explicit intentions of the Framers. It is inconsistent
with the Constitution's language and structure. It departs sharply from
traditional congressional practice. It may generate constitutional litigation that
will encourage Supreme Court intervention in an area best left to responsible
congressional decision.
Unless the proposal is withdrawn now, it will serve as an unfortunate
precedent for the proliferation of supermajority rules on a host of different
subjects in the future. Over time, we will see the continuing erosion of our
central constitutional commitments to majority rule and deliberative
democracy.
1. Original Intentions
The present proposal is unprecedented, but it was anticipated by James
Madison in a remarkably prescient discussion in The Federalist-a document
* Editor's Note: On December 7, 1994, Republican members of the House of Representatives
proposed dramatic changes to the House Rules, including a measure that would require any tax increase
to gain the votes of three-fifths rather than a majority of lawmakers. Leading constitutional scholars
submitted this letter to the future Speaker of the House. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.). on December 23. 1994
When the 104th Congress convened on January 4. 1995. the Rules Committee, chaired by Gerald B.H.
Solomon (R-N.Y.) limited debate on the measure to 20 minutes. The measure passed by a vote of 279 to
152. On February 8, 1995, 15 Members of the House. joined by the League of Women Voters and
individual constituents, filed suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the new Rule.
1. Limitations on Tax Increases: (a) No bill, joint resolution, amendment or conference
report carrying an income tax rate increase could be considered as passed or agreed
to unless so determined by a vote of at least three-fifths of the House. (b) No
measure or amendment could be considered that contains a retroactive income tax
rate increase.
H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1995).
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that you rightly urge your colleagues to reread with care. The Federalist
No. 58 explicitly addresses complaints concerning the constitutional design of
the House. It concludes by confronting an objection "against the number made
competent for legislative business." Madison's description perfectly fits the
present proposal: "It has been said that more than a majority ought to have
been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all, more than
a majority of a quorum for a decision. 2 Madison rejects this suggestion, but
only after recognizing that it serves certain values-notably it might serve as
a "shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty
and partial measures."3  Nonetheless, he finds these considerations
"outweighed" by more fundamental ones:
In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws
to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental
principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer
the majority that would rule; the power would be transferred to the
minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an
interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves
from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or in particular
emergencies to extort unreasonable indulgences.'
Madison's audience understood the backdrop of these remarks. The Articles of
Confederation required congressional supermajorities for especially important
subjects, including the raising and spending of money.5 But the Philadelphia
Convention decisively rejected such a system, repeatedly voting down key
proposals that would have imposed supermajorities in legislative fields of
special sensitivity.' In The Federalist No. 22, Alexander Hamilton explicitly
defended this decision to break with the supermajority system of the Articles,
insisting that ordinary legislation should not "give a minority a negative upon
the majority.",
7
The Founders' rejection of a selective supermajority rule for especially
sensitive legislation was neither casual nor peripheral to their larger design.
Instead, it was based on practical experience and careful consideration of the
arguments on both sides. Nothing in the past two centuries of our history
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 396 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
3. Id. at 396-97.
4. Id. at 397.
5. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX, § 6 (1781).
6. These proposals sought to impose a two-thirds rule on legislation dealing with commerce and
navigation-fields that were understood to be sensitive precisely because they characteristically involved
taxation. 5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTrIUTION 489-92, 552
(reprint ed. 1987) (1888).
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Like Madison,
Hamilton counseled that "much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be
necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at
particular periods." Id. at 141.
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authorizes a simple majority of the House to take unilateral action and restrike
the constitutional balance.
2. Constitutional Text and Structure
Of course, there are times when the Constitution weighs the balance
differently. On seven different occasions, it stipulates a supermajority
requirement.8 But it never makes three-fifths, rather than two-thirds, the
numerical hurdle. More fundamentally, it never places any special obstacles in
the way of the enactment of ordinary legislation signed by the President.9 As
the Chadha case teaches, this carefully considered lawmaking system can only
be changed by constitutional amendment.'0
If the present proposal were legitimate, it would set a precedent for endless
proliferation of supermajority requirements. If income tax increases can be
subject to a special rule, why not national defense or civil rights? Since a 60%
rule has no special place in the constitutional text, why not 55% or 73%?
Indeed, the present proposal already suggests how easily this logic may be
extended. It not only contains a three-fifths rule for income tax increases, but
imposes a kind of unanimity rule for the special category of "retroactive"
taxes-already propelling us down the path of proliferation.
It is true that the Constitution gives each house the right "to determine the
rules of its proceedings."" This sensible housekeeping provision, however,
does not authorize the House to violate fundamental principles of constitutional
democracy. It simply authorizes the House to organize itself for informed and
efficient debate and decision.
Indeed, we have no objection to supermajority rules so long as they fit
comfortably within this rationale. Consider, for example, the House rule that
requires a two-thirds vote to suspend the rules for the expeditious consideration
of legislation. This supermajority requirement transparently serves the interest
of efficient decision making. If it were too easy to suspend House rules, there
would be undue disruption of the normal system of deliberation and decision;
but if it were impossible, the House would be incapable of responding to
8. The original Constitution identifies five contexts for supennajonty rule-when ovemding
presidential vetoes, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. cl. 2, ratifying treaties. td. art. 1I. § 2. cl. 2. proposing
constitutional amendments, id. art. V, convicting on impeachments. td. art. 1. § 3. cl 6. and expelling
members, id. art. I, § 5. cl. 2, from the House or Senate. Two others arc added by the Fourteenth
Amendment (two-thirds of both Houses required to remove disability of rebellious officeholders) and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment (two-thirds of both Houses required to establish presidential disability to
discharge duties of office). In addition, the Twelfth Amendment requires an absolute majonty of the
relevant chamber in cases where no candidate for President or Vice-President has won a majority in the
Electoral College.
9. The textual commitment to majority rule is also expressed by the grant of a vote to the Vice-
President in those cases in which the Senators are "equally divided." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 3.
10. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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emergencies. Hence, a two-thirds rule is a perfectly appropriate way to exercise
the House's power "to determine the rules of its proceedings."
But the present proposal cannot be justified as a general procedure aimed
at inducing deliberative decision making. It is simply based upon substantive
and selective judgments that income tax increases-and only these
increases-are unwise and should not be encouraged. Such opinions are
entirely defensible, but they do not fall within the limited constitutional
authority granted to each house over its "proceedings."
There is much more than language at stake. House rules are enacted on the
first day of each session. Hence substantive judgments made in the rules
cannot be the result of serious deliberation by the Members. House rules are
made unilaterally without consultation with the Senate. Hence substantive
judgments cannot be reached after the complex bicameral process contemplated
by Article I. House rules are made by a bare majority. Hence the enactment
of supermajority rules provides a mechanism to transform a narrow majority
into a supermajority at a time when the process of substantive deliberation has
not yet seriously begun. The introduction of substantive policies into
procedural rules, then, undermines the system of deliberative democracy
established at the Founding.
Defenders of the supermajority rule have minimized its threat to
constitutional values by suggesting "that the same House majority that votes
to impose a three-fifths rule could as easily vote to rescind that rule if it truly
wanted to raise taxes."' 2 But this claim is simply false. Once the 60%
provision is on the books, its operation would apply to tax legislation unless
the House agreed to suspend its rules. Such a suspension, however, can only
occur after a two-thirds vote. House traditions even give the Speaker unilateral
authority to refuse to recognize a motion to suspend the rules, even if two-
thirds of the Members wish to allow the majority to have its say. 3
Indeed, even if the House wished to reconsider an opening-day decision
to impose a three-fifths rule, it would have great difficulty doing so. Such an
effort normally requires the prior approval of the House Rules Committee,
whose composition does not mirror the House as a whole. The only remaining
method for reconsideration is the notoriously difficult procedure by which 218
Members may force the Rules Committee to "discharge" a measure that it has
bottled up.'4 While 218 is an absolute majority of the whole House, requiring
such a large number is inconsistent with Madison's insistence that "a majority
of a quorum" should suffice for ordinary legislation. By the time this
mechanism could be employed, moreover, the chance to vote on pending tax
measures may have long since passed.
12. Roger Pilon, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TtMES, Dec. 16, 1994, at A38.
13. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE 299 (1989).
14. Id. at 314-26.
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There is no escape, then, from the conclusion that the proposed rule strikes
at the heart of the system of deliberative democracy established by the
Constitution.
3. Congressional Practice
The 60% proposal seems to be based on an analogy to the Senate's
practice on cloture. Whatever the constitutional merits of the filibuster rule, it
does not provide a sound precedent. By making it hard to stop filibusters, the
cloture rule encourages more fully informed discussion and thus falls within
the rationale of the Constitution's grant of rulemaking power to both houses.
In contrast to this general procedural norm, the House proposal is selective and
substantive. It is simply beyond the scope of the House's rulemaking authority.
It is quite true that, since 1985, Congress has passed new rules requiring
a three-fifths majority in the Senate as part of the budget reconciliation
process.' 5 While these provisions are vulnerable to our constitutional
objection, they are such recent innovations that they can hardly count as a
"tradition" that demands constitutional respect.
4. Supreme Court Review
We believe that the constitutional violation created by the proposal is
sufficiently plain and fundamental to warrant action by the Supreme Court. As
the Court cautioned in United States v. Ballin, House rules may not "ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights."' 6 The Court went on
to elaborate principles of constitutional interpretation of decisive significance
in the present case:
[T]he general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum
is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body.
This has been the rule for all time, except so far as in any given case
the terms of the organic act under which the body is assembled have
prescribed specific limitations. 7
We emphasize, however, that it would be far better to rethink the issue at
this stage than to invite litigation. Not only would litigation lead to a
protracted period of uncertainty, it would also destroy a valuable, two-century-
15. Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman.Holings, 76 CAt.. L.
REV. 593, 666 (1988). These rules were expanded in scope in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13208, 104 Stat. 1388. 1388-619. As in previous years. Congress made it
clear that such statutory creation of supermajority rules involved "-an exercise of the rulcmaking power of
the... Senate." ld. § 13305, 104 Stat. at 1388-627; see also Pub. L. No. 103-66. § 14004. 107 Stat. 685
(1993) (reaffirming rulemaking powers of Senate and House).
16. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
17. Id. at 6.
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old House tradition of constitutional self-restraint in the exercise of its
rulemaking powers. It would be far better to redeem this tradition now without
the need of an unnecessary confrontation with the Court.
Indeed, both the Senate and the President would also find themselves
drawn into the controversy. Both would be required to define their own
constitutional responsibilities if a tax measure gained the support of a House
majority that fell short of three-fifths. The resulting confusion would
undermine fundamental commitments to the rule of law and would predictably
draw the Supreme Court into the affair.
Under applicable precedent, Representatives have standing to challenge
basic lawmaking practices that dilute the voting power the Constitution grants
to them and their constituents.' 8 Other cases establish that the Supreme Court
will intervene on the merits to protect the integrity of the deliberative and
democratic process established by the Constitution.' 9
But the better part of wisdom is to avoid confrontation and return to the
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18. Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d
430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that Senator had standing to challenge pocket veto that allegedly
nullified his vote); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 25-30 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub noma. Burke
v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (reaffirming Kennedy analysis of standing); PAUL M. BATOR Er AL,, HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 157 n.7 (3d ed. 1988); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 152-54 (2d ed. 1988).
19. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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